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Introduction
For Muslims, the mosque is a central institution. Not only does the mosque serve as a religious institution where sermons, prayer and devotional acts are performed in order to create a 'moral community' ,² but also as a 'religious sphere' .³ Theoretically, the notion of 'mosque as religious sphere' is derived from the idea of public sphere in the Western context, something that is considered as lacking theoretical significance in the Muslim world. The narrow definition of the so-called public sphere in the Western context implies the receding role of religion, limiting the significance of religion to the household and private sphere. Introducing the concept of a religious sphere makes it possible to do justice to the considerable role of religion in public space.⁴ Within the just mentioned perspective, the centrality of the mosque lies in its multiple-functionality, which represents a way for Islam to leave the private sphere and officially enter the public sphere linking the dynamics of Muslim life and its many facets, from the religious, social and cultural to the political.⁵ In politics, for example, the mosque functions as a vehicle for supporting certain political views or otherwise as a social site for the mobilisation of collective action, in addition to being an arena for controlling religious discourse prevalent in society.⁶ However, the strategic position of the mosque in many cases leads to conflicts between Muslim agencies, groups and views, even the government's, over who has power in relation to the mosque. This has happened in Europe, and also elsewhere, where Muslims are struggling to maintain their Islamic identity in the face of rapid change brought about by modernity and the Western political circumstances of non-Muslim surroundings. Mosques in European countries have been one of the most heatedly debated issues -and, in many cases, the cause of conflicts -between Muslims and their non-Muslim environments, between Muslims and governments, not to mention between the multiple Islamic interpretations and views of Muslims themselves.⁷ In Malaysia, Partai Islam se-Malaysia (pas, Pan-Malaysian Islamic Party) and the United Malays National Organisation (umno) have challenged each other's control over the mosque. The issue of debate between these parties is the extent to which mosques are open to political campaigning.⁸
In Indonesia, as in other Muslim countries, there has traditionally been a distinction between 'official' and 'private' mosques. Whereas the former type are founded by the state, which controls all related activities and disseminates a 'depoliticised' version of Islam designed to remain passive in the face of state power, the private ones, in contrast, are built with private donations, often from wealthy individuals and provide a 'free' space for an Islamic discourse that is not controlled by the state.⁹ Unfortunately, no accurate data are available on the number of mosques in Indonesia. One estimate from 2010, not differentiating between official and private ones, mentions 800,000.¹⁰ This number probably does not include smaller places of worship, such as the surau, langgar and musholla.¹¹ Each kabupaten usually has only one official mosque, often called the Masjid Jami (grand mosque), whereas others are private. These private mosques are usually attached to Islamic organisations, primarily Muhammadiyah and Nahdlatul Ulama (nu). For these two organisations mosques are pivotal in disseminating their Islamic discourse to their audiences, despite the half-hearted political interests of both organisations in Indonesian politics. In addition to official and private mosques, there are also the semi-official mosques funded primarily by the New Order government through the Yayasan Amal Bhakti Muslim Pancasila (yamp). The yamp is a semi-governmental organisation initiated by the New Order government in 1982. By 2009 it had built 999 mosques throughout the archipelago. Unlike the mosques attached to Muhammadiyah and the nu, these semi-official mosques are erected on the initiative of the state and display particular symbols that refer to the interests of the state; for example, the ornament on the top of the mosque that reproduces the word of Allah in Arabic script within a pentagonal frame, resembling the pentagonal symbol of Pancasila.¹² Consequently, these yamp mosques are often called 'Masjid Pancasila' , Pancasila mosques. Besides the above mosque distinction, it is worth mentioning four ways in which the public attaches a particular identity to a mosque and links it with certain Indonesian Muslim organisations. Firstly, the identification is based on a public announcement by an individual or a group who transferred his or her authority over the land and the building of the mosque to a certain organisation through a waqf (endowment). Secondly, the identification is built upon attributes which characterise a certain organisation, such as the dominant symbol of the mosque, the colour of the building, the calendar hanging on the wall, and other such features. These attributes mainly represent certain organisations or groups, such as the pentagonal symbol of the Pancasila mosque and the crescent-star which is mainly seen as a symbol of Muhammadiyah. The dominant colour of the mosque building may also play a key role in the identification. Brown is mainly associated with the Partai Keadilan Sejahtera/pks (Prosperous Justice Party), whereas green is attributed to Nahdlatul Ulama and white to Muhammadiyah. Therefore, the colour is not merely of aesthetic consideration, but also an organisational statement as well, as is the calendar on the wall of the mosque. Thirdly, the rituals performed in the mosque may also signify the identity of the mosque. Fourthly, the organisational affiliation of the takmir ([senior] mosque managers) is yet another essential element of identification. Most mosques in Indonesia are mainly identified through the last two patterns, as is the case with the Al Muttaqun mosque discussed here.
As a general topic, this contribution emphasises the political dimension of the mosque. In so doing, it concentrates on the conflict between an Indonesian Islamist party, the pks, and the second largest Muslim organisation in Indonesia, Muhammadiyah, over the Al Muttaqun mosque in Prambanan, Klaten, Central Java. It starts with a discussion about the centrality of the mosque in the light of pks politics and the party's political performance in Klaten. The last two sections will specifically deal with the conflict between the pks and Muhammadiyah over the Al Muttaqun mosque.
The pks's View of the Centrality of the Mosque
Partai Keadilan Sejahtera (pks) was founded on 20 July 1998 as the Partai Keadilan. The party was officially launched on 9 August 1998 by a number pre-independence Indonesia to the New Order: see Kees van Dijk, 'the Changing Contour of Mosques' , in Peter J.M. Nas, The Past in the Present Architecture in Indonesia (Leiden: kitlv Press, 2007), 45-60. of tarbiyah¹³ activists at the Al-Azhar mosque in Jakarta. As a movement, tarbiyah introduced a creed that combined the Islamism of Egypt's Ikwanul Muslimin (Muslim Brotherhood) with the idea of individual faith and reform, and one of the specific characters of tarbiyah is their overt political orientation.¹⁴ This is clearly demonstrated through its statute in which pks claims to be a manifestation of the umma through the slogan al-hizbu huwa al-jamaʾah wa al-jamaʾatu hiya al-hizb (the party is the Muslim community and the Muslim community is the party).¹⁵ It also stresses that it is a dakwah (Arabic: calling or invite) party which is translated as 'a party that strives to implement Islam as the solution for the life of the nation and the country, to realise the Islamic system and values as blessings for the universe. '¹⁶ Nevertheless, the pks's ideology and political platform to cultivate dakwah have generated suspicion that the party harbours a hidden agenda to establish an Islamic state.¹⁷ The pks is also depicted as being a fundamentalist party, a representation of Indonesian-Wahhabism, and of having aims to establish a worldwide khilafah.¹⁸ In addition to the historical facts mentioned above, the importance of the mosque for pks politics is well accentuated through the pks's call for a Gerakan Kembali ke Masjid (Back to the Mosque Movement) in 2011, which the party used to emphasise the centrality of the mosque in terms of Islamic education and as a way of preventing teenagers from misbehaving.²¹ However, this programme is neither merely ethical nor religious as it is also closely linked to the pks's political mobilisation through the mosque. In addition, in 2011, Tifatul Sembiring, the former president of pks and Along with the pks's political activities through the mosque, the party has also been renowned for establishing Islamic schools or the so-called 'Sekolah Islam Terpadu' (Integrated Islamic Schools), rather than madrasah. This type of educational institution has flourished due to mosque-based activism and the schools are mainly established in areas surrounding mosques. The words 'Islam Terpadu' refer to a type of education that practises Islamic models of curricula and integrates secular and Islamic subjects. The tarbiyah movement introduced the name and concept of these Islamic educational institutions in the 1990s, claiming that such education guaranteed the fulfillment of the spiritual and intellectual health of children and teenagers. In such educational institutions, students have to undergo a full day of schooling in which they learn secular and religious topics under the strict supervision of their teachers, resembling the model of the cadre education of the Islamic Brotherhood, which emphasises the dominant role of the murabbi (Arabic: instructor) in supervising the religious life of the students.²⁴ Another dakwah activity by the pks worthy of mention is the pks's affiliated relief organisation, Pos Keadilan Peduli Ummat/pkpu (Centre for Justice and the Care of Society). This has been one of the most important relief organisations operating specifically in disaster-affected particularly providing religious lessons for teenagers and children. The pks's attention for these young activists is not surprising when we look at the fact that the pks relies on the political support of the younger generation and the party's strategic agenda to educate and indoctrinate young activists for the sake of winning future elections.  'jprmi Kembangkan Kewirausahaan' , Republika, 12 August 2011, 'Juni Supriyanto, Tak Sebatas Pelatihan' , http://koran.republika.co.id/koran/52/142898/Juni _Supriyanto_Tak_Sebatas_Pelatihan (accessed 3 May 2012).  Noorhaidi Hasan, 'Education, Young Islamists and Integrated Islamic Schools in Indonesia ' , Studia Islamika, Vol. 19, No. 1, 2012, 79-111. areas, both nationally and internationally.²⁵ One of the most distinctive characteristics of the pkpu is that it pays attention not only to tangible problems brought about by natural disasters, but also to religious ones. In so doing, the pkpu has aimed at the building of mosques in many areas, including places where no natural disaster has occurred. In short, the above discussion reveals that one of the remarkable characteristics of the pks is its model of political mobilisation, which combines religious and political struggles. Stressing that it is a dakwah party makes for an institution that is a political party as well as an Islamic socio-religious organisation. Its roots and past activities as well as its political performance emphasise the centrality of the mosque for the pks. The following discussion is on pks politics in the local context, i.e. Klaten, Central Java. How the dakwah slogan is translated into local politics is an important part of the discussion, in addition to the consequences of pks dakwah politics.
The pks in Klaten
Klaten is home to the abangan²⁶ community. It also is a 'red area' as it had been a base for Sukarno's Indonesian nationalist party (pni, Partai Nasional Indonesia), rather than Islam. and to create agents of dakwah. As is also the case with Hidayah, leaders of the pesantren belong to the pks elite in Klaten. Among them are Muʾinuddinillah Basri, the director of the pesantren, and Suciningsih, the director of yasr and a member of the consultative body of the pesantren, as is Hidayat Nur Wahid. It is worth noting that, in addition to being director of the pesantren and an active member of the Shariah Council of the pks, Muʾinuddinillah Basri also serves as director of the post-graduate programme for Islamic studies at the Universitas Muhammadiyah Surakarta (ums). Hidayat Hur Wahid also established the Yayasan Al Muttaqun (Al Muttaqun Foundation) on 26 June 2006, precisely one month after the Yogyakarta earthquake. In its official document, the foundation explains that it carries out a number of activities related to dakwah, collects and distributes zakat, infaq and sedekah, and handles the management of the Al Muttaqun mosque, which the foundation has made its headquarters.³¹ However, it is important to note that the establishment of the foundation is closely related to the pks's political activism through the mosque, i.e. the political efforts of Hidayat Nur Wahid and core members of the pks in relation to controlling the mosque, replacing Muhammadiyah. In addition, the establishment is also related to the efforts of the pks to acquire financial support from Middle Eastern waqf foundations, which require potential recipients to have official permission from the government or at least a notary public's certificate. In view of this, it is not surprising that the establishment of the Al Muttaqun foundation has generated conflict between the pks and Muhammadiyah. This conflict will be discussed in detail in the next section.
Disputes over the Al Muttaqun Mosque
Disputes over mosques are not unusual in Indonesia as the country's mosques have been associated with certain Islamic organisations or views. Prior to Indonesian independence and during the first half of the New Order period, the conflicts involved reformist (Muhammadiyah) and traditionalist (Nahdlatul Ulama/nu) Muslims. In the practice of azan (call to prayer) for example, traditional Muslims read the shalawat (praises to the Prophet Muhammad) prior to the azan, whereas reformists consider such practice as bidʿa (unlawful innovation). Another example that illustrates the controversial issues between the two is the presence of the bedug (drum), the function of which is to mark religious moments, mainly to alert Muslims to the five daily prayers. Whereas reformists consider this instrument to be un-Islamic and a kind of bidʿa, traditionalists have kept firmly to this tradition. However, during the 1980s, such controversial issues concerning sunnah (recommended ritual) and bidʿa were not given much public attention as Muhammadiyah and nu had started to work together.³² Following the Indonesian reformation of 1998, public disputes over the mosque re-emerged. A clear indication of the new prominence of disputes over mosques is the emergence of the 'sabotage and infiltration of mosques' issue. This refers to mosques that were previously attached to Muhammadiyah or the nu but came to be controlled by organisations or groups whose Islamic ideals and principles are considered to be contradictory to those of these two organisations. The perpetrators are usually identified as transnational and Islamist groups whose Islamic views challenge the idea of Indonesia as a national state and endanger social harmony in society. Specifically, the accusation of sabotage is levelled at the pks, which is perceived as being the most active in resorting to what are considered to be sabotage and infiltration. Responding to this external threat by the pks, in 2006 Muhammadiyah issued a circular letter on 'Konsolidasi Organisasi dan Amal Usaha Muhammadiyah' (Consolidating Muhammadiyah's organisation and its social services bodies) aimed at protecting Muhammadiyah's assets from being taken over and their management committees and boards from being infiltrated by the pks.³³ In 2007, in an identical move, the nu issued a fatwa alerting Indonesian Muslims to the danger presented by the idea of khilafah, the promotion of an Islamic state, and the call for byelaws implementing Shariah that were propagated by Islamist organisations through their mosque-based activism.³⁴ Though the nu's fatwa does not mention the pks by name, as the circular letter of Muhammadiyah does, the nu shares Muhammadiyah's suspicion of the pks, where cases of so-called mosque infiltration are concerned.³⁵  The growing acceptance of each other by Muhammadiyah and nu has been identified since the 1970s when both started to work hand in hand for the benefit of the Muslim community, rather than continuing their antagonism: Erected on a piece of land obtained from the Surakarta kraton (palace) as a waqf for Muslims living in Prambanan, the mosque is a private rather than an official one. Despite the fact that the mosque was given to Muslims in general, the people living in the environs of the mosque maintained that it belonged to Muhammadiyah, prior to becoming a pks one later. They based their view on the fact that the rituals performed in the mosque were akin to those of Muhammadiyah and that its takmir was affiliated to Muhammadiyah.
Prior to the 2006 earthquake, the Al Muttaqun mosque was surrounded by two other buildings, a house belonging to Bani Ibrahim and the Taman Kanak-kanak Aisyiyah Bustanul Athfal/tk aba Ngangkruk. The house of Bani Ibrahim had been in the area since the colonial era when Ibrahim, the great-grandfather of the last occupant of the house, Ahmadi, served as katib (secretary whose duties include the registration of Islamic affairs, mainly marriage). tk aba Ngangkruk is a kindergarten founded in 1956 that falls under the supervision of the Prambanan branch of Aisyiyah, the women's organisation of Muhammadiyah.⁴² One month after the Yogyakarta earthquake, the dispute over the Al Muttaqun mosque between the pks and Muhammadiyah broke out.⁴³ It However, it is worth noting that the establishment of foundations by the pks is not unusual, particularly when referring to cases in Prambanan after the 2006 earthquake. During my fieldwork, I found three notary deeds registered on 1 July 2007. These concerned the establishment of three foundations all named the tk aba foundation. These deeds seem to be illegal as only the Muhammadiyah central board can issue deeds founding Muhammadiyah schools. When I confronted the leaders of Muhammadiyah of Prambanan with these findings, they acknowledged that the organisation had investigated these problems. The investigation revealed that a number of Muhammadiyah leaders mentioned in the deeds were ignorant of the establishment of those foundations. However, they acknowledged that people from Hidayat Nur Wahid's circle had asked them to hand over their identity cards (Kartu Tanda Penduduk/ktp) for the purpose of obtaining financial support for Muhammadiyah schools, not for registering new organisations. The pcm then reported the matter to the notary public who issued the deeds and warned him that the pcm might pursue the case in court. The three deeds were annulled by the notary public a few days later. Hidayat Nur Wahid became chairman of the Majelis Permusyawaratan Rakyat/mpr (People's Consultative Assembly), gaining many contacts in the world of politics and in the bureaucracy.
With the experience he gained in politics and in the bureaucracy, while serving as chairman of the mpr, Hidayat Nur Wahid was seen as the mastermind behind the initiative to change the status of the mosque from a waqf for Muslims in general to one owned by a specific institution (i.e. the Al Muttaqun Foundation). Muhammadiyah activists in Klaten are sure that the transformation of the status of the mosque would have been impossible without the political intervention of Hidayat Nur Wahid as chairman of the mpr. They see the ultimate proof of this in the fact that it took only one day (1 July 2006) for a land certificate for the mosque to be issued, legitimising the Al Muttaqun Foundation's ownership of the land. This is exceptional as usually such a procedure takes months to be completed.⁴⁶
The Conflict between the pks and Muhammadiyah in Prambanan Reaches its Climax
Following the 2006 earthquake and the establishment of the Al Muttaqun Foundation, Hidayat Nur Wahid had several meetings with a number of national leaders including the Indonesian President, Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono. He informed them that the Al Muttaqun mosque had collapsed, and invited them to contribute to its restoration. Having received a financial contribution from the Waqf Ministry of the Qatar government, the pks was able to rebuild the mosque in 2006 to the tune of 12 billion rupiah. The new building of the mosque is brown -a colour commonly linked to the pks by the public -and it was officially inaugurated on 13 March 2009. Hidayat Nur Wahid, the Indonesian Minister of the Interior, Mardiyanto, and a number of officials in Central Java, among them its governor, Bibit Waluyo, and the head of Klaten kabupaten, Sunarno, attended this public ceremony, where  For a land certificate to be issued the National Land Agency (Badan Pertanahan Nasonal/bpn) must perform several procedures, ranging from registration of the applicant, measuring the land, and ensuring the status of the land is not in dispute.
In its official regulation, the whole process needs at least 98 days to complete for waqf land. See the regulation at www.bpn.go.id/Beranda/Layanan-Pertanahan/ PELAYANAN-PENDAFTARAN-TANAH-PERTAMA-KALI/Wakaf/WAKAF -DARI-TANAH-BELUM-BERSERTIPIKAT-KONVERSI,-PE.aspx (accessed 3 May 2012).
the establishment of the Saihul Jasim Bin Muhammad Alistani Islamic Centre, named after the founder of modern Qatar, was also announced. In his official speech at the inauguration, Hidayat Nur Wahid mentioned that the building of the mosque expressed his deep commitment to the development of his homeland (bali ndeso, mbangun ndeso [back to village to develop it]) and the building of the mosque was inspired by the Hindu legend of Bandung-Bondowoso who built the Prambanan temple in only one night.⁴⁷ With regard to its architecture, Hidayat Nur Wahid said that the building also represented the nature of Islam in Java, which, he stressed, respects other religious traditions and might have provided a model for the development of Islam in Indonesia.⁴⁸ He also mentioned that the building reflected the glorious past of Islam in Indonesia, Europe and the Middle East. The gate of the mosque was modelled on the gate of Cordoba's mosque in Spain, while the two minarets resembled those of two holy mosques in Mecca and Medina. Furthermore, there are names of Javanese wali in Arabic script written along the whole length of the interior wall of the mosque.
Leaders of the pcm in Prambanan questioned the reports about the collapse of the Al Muttaqun mosque in the media and also what Hidayat Nur Wahid had told the Indonesian President in May and again in October 2006. In an interview, the chairman of the Al Muttaqun takmir, Ahyadi, indirectly acknowledged that the earthquake had not caused damage to the mosque. However, he refused to respond to the accusation by Muhammadiyah activists that Hidayat Nur Wahid had manipulated information about the condition of the building following the earthquake.⁴⁹ They argued that the mosque had still been standing firmly, unaffected by the earthquake, whereas two other buildings, the house of Bani Ibrahim and tk aba Ngangkruk, were totally ruined.⁵⁰ A number of Muhammadiyah leaders in Prambanan said they were almost sure that Hidayat Nur Wahid had given out falsified information for the sake of his party. The conflict between the pks and Muhammadiyah deteriorated even further in October 2006 when the pcm in Prambanan officially launched a plan for the rehabilitation of the tk aba Ngangkruk building. According to Sajiran, the chairman of the pcm in Prambanan, the takmir took a number of steps to prevent this. It had invited leaders of the pcm and Aisyiyah in Prambanan to a number of meetings in which the takmir said Muhammadiyah had to choose between two options, which amounted to the same thing; i.e. to abandon the kindergarten, either by moving it to another place or renting a house for the kindergarten, or building the school elsewhere. The reason was that the takmir wanted to establish an Islamic centre on the premises of the tk aba. In addition, on 14 October 2006, the head of the village also came out against rebuilding the school. In an official letter he instructed Muhammadiyah to cancel the plans for the official cornerstone-laying ceremony for the reconstruction of the tk aba building.⁵¹ The pcm did not comply and the ceremony took place on 15 October. It was attended by Amien Rais, former chairman of Muhammadiyah and the mpr,⁵² and Chamamah Suratno, the chairperson of the central board of Aisyiyah.
Sajiran and other Muhammadiyah leaders in Prambanan said that they had been targets of intimidation prior to the cornerstone-laying ceremony. pks activists and the takmir of Al Muttaqun had come to their houses and had threatened to harm them and their families if the ceremony went ahead. They added that the takmir had also warned them that they would burn and destroy the new building of tk aba Ngangkruk once its construction was completed. Furthermore, Sajiran claims that Hidayat Nur Wahid had given money to high-ranking officials in Prambanan and Muhammadiyah members in an effort to prevent .  Prior to the ceremony, the pcm met with Amien Rais to discuss the possibility of him attending the ceremony and to consult with him about the conflict between the pks and Muhammadiyah in Prambanan. According to Sajiran, Amien Rais strongly rejected the takmir's plan to close the tk aba. He also considered it wrong that Bani Ibrahim had accepted money in exchange for moving house. Amien Rais gave 30 million rupiah to Bani Ibrahim (Ahmadi) and asked him to return the money to the takmir.
Amien Rais speaking at cornerstone-laying ceremony for the reconstruction of the tk aba Ngangkruk building (by courtesy of pcm Prambanan) the rebuilding of the kindergarten. Mursyid Suprihatin, a teacher at the Muhammadiyah school in Prambanan, and Slamet Sugimin, one of Muhammadiyah activists in Prambanan, were mentioned. They would receive a Rp. 5 million monthly salary from the Al Muttaqun Foundation if they sided with Hidayat Nur Wahid, rather than with Muhammadiyah. In addition, Hidayat Nur Wahid would have given free tickets for an exclusive pilgrimage package (Haji-plus) to the heads of the sub-districts (camat) of Prambanan and Ahyadi.⁵³ Worried by the conflict over Al Muttaqun, the head of Klaten kabupaten invited Muhammadiyah and the pks leaders to a series of meetings in order to arrive at a solution.⁵⁴ It is also reported that national leaders of Muhammadiyah held a number of informal meetings with Hidayat Nur Wahid to discuss the problem.⁵⁵ A compromise was reached. Whereas the takmir of Al Muttaqun would be responsible for mosque affairs and the rebuilding of the mosque, Muhammadiyah would be allowed to continue with its plan for the construction of a new building for the tk aba Ngangkruk next to the mosque. However, this did not mean that the tension between the two disappeared. A number of Muhammadiyah activists in Klaten remain of the opinion that the pks had, in their words, sabotaged and taken over their mosque. In a series of interviews, they left no doubt that, in their opinion, the conflict between the two sides was far from over, pointing out that the affair had generated a 'perang' or war between the pks and Muhammadiyah at the local level. Furthermore, from the moment the dispute over the mosque emerged, Muhammadiyah leaders in Prambanan refused to visit the mosque to perform prayers or other religious rituals, out of resentment.
The takmir rejected the accusations of sabotage and of using the mosque for pks politics; emphasising that the mosque was endowed for Muslims in Kabondalem Kidul, Prambanan, and open to all Muslims, regardless of their backgrounds, Ahyadi maintains that Muhammadiyah is in fact still in control of the mosque as a majority of the takmir members have a Muhammadiyah background.⁵⁶ However, Ahyadi's arguments seems to be apologetic as the problem of changing the management of the mosque from Muhammadiyah to the pks -not to mention sabotage and infiltration -is acknowledged by Muhammadiyah colleagues as well as the people who live near the mosque.
According to some Muhammadiyah members in Klaten, the politicisation of the Al Muttaqun mosque by the pks is quite obvious. They point to a number of cases that indicate that the mosque is becoming a place for political mobilisation by the pks, such as through mabit and liqo meetings. In addition, a prominent Muhammadiyah leader in Prambanan says that he received many complaints from the parents of students of the Muhammadiyah Boarding School/mbs in Prambanan. They received a leaflet issued by the Al Muttaqun Foundation inviting them to enroll their children at an Islamic school (Islamic centre) that was to be founded by Hidayat Nur Wahid and the takmir of Al Muttaqun.⁵⁷ Sajiran also points out that the exclusion of Muhammadiyah from the takmir and the list of khatib (preachers of the Friday sermon) of the mosque also shows that the takmir has excluded Muhammadiyah and uses the mosque for pks's political ends.⁵⁸ Even though he admitted that in 2007 Hidayat Nur Wahid had paid for his pilgrimage, Ahyadi rejected the accusation that the pks has used the Al Muttaqun mosque for political mobilisation. He stressed that the Al Muttaqun mosque serves as a religious institution for Muslims in Kebondalem Kidul, Prambanan, to express their religiosity. Moreover, the takmir of the mosque had explained to Muhammadiyah that they were not attached to a certain political party. The primary task of the takmir is to serve the religious needs of the people living near the mosque and to organise religious activities such as the five daily prayers. Countering the accusation that the takmir excluded Muhammadiyah members from joining the congregation, Ahyadi made the case that a number of Muhammadiyah leaders are still involved in the management of the mosque and that the takmir invited a khatib from Muhammadiyah to deliver Friday sermons in the mosque.⁵⁹ Ahyadi's explanation however did not impress Muhammadiyah leaders in Prambanan. He was called a snake in the grass and was accused of being a spy for Hidayat Nur Wahid in Muhammadiyah circles. Because of this, Ahyadi failed to become chairman of the pcm in 2010. Sajiran was re-elected. ⁶⁰ Having experienced what it considers to be sabotage and infiltration, and responding to the 2006 circular letter from the Muhammadiyah central board concerning the protection of Muhammadiyah assets, the local board of Muhammadiyah in Klaten has taken measures to protect its mosques from other acts of 'sabotage' . It has initiated a so-called 'bersih-bersih' or purification programme intended to protect Muhammadiyah assets, to get rid of pks activists in Muhammadiyah, and to shield the minds of Muhammadiyah followers from the tarbiyah ideology. In an interview, Iskak Sulistiya, the General Secretary of Pimpinan Daerah Muhammadiyah/pdm in Klaten, explains that up to now this has taken two forms: plangisasi (labelling the mosque) and dai muqim (the resident Islamic preacher). In the plangisasi a 'label or stamp' is given to every Muhammadiyah mosque, leaving no doubt that they indeed belong to Muhammadiyah. Through dai muqim, Muhammadiyah invite their activists at the local level to participate in training courses for mosque management. In addition to improving the skills of Islamic preachers through training, Muhammadiyah in Klaten also provide financial support to promote mosque-based outreach programmes and to protect Muhammadiyah mosques.⁶¹ Furthermore, the current chairman of the Muhammadiyah branch in Prambanan considers the issuing of notary deeds for Muhammadiyah assets in Prambanan to be of primary importance, as it protects Muhammadiyah's schools and mosques from further attempts at sabotage. To conclude, and to position the case in a more general trend, this specific form of conflict over the mosque may become more frequent in Indonesia in the future. Therefore, as a recommendation for future research on mosques in Indonesia, the variety of mosques in contemporary Indonesia is an important subject of inquiry. The research should also include a discussion of the central position of the mosque in the religious sphere of Muslims, as well as the socio-political position of the mosque in the Indonesian public sphere. One of the important questions concerning the latter is the extent to which the mosque plays a significant role in political mobilisation, in addition to looking at models of mosque-based engagement in politics. Another important subject for examination is the relationship between Indonesian Muslim organisations and political parties, mainly Islamic parties. In order to do so, the clear-cut differentiation of civil society, on the one hand, and political society, on the other, must be critically questioned.
